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Delusions are symptoms of psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia and demen-
tia. By and large, delusions are characterized by their behavioral manifestations
and defined as irrational beliefs that compromise good functioning. In this over-
view paper, we ask whether delusions can be adaptive notwithstanding their nega-
tive features. Can they be a response to a crisis rather than the source of the crisis?
Can they be the beginning of a solution rather than the problem? Some of the psy-
chological, psychiatric, and philosophical literature has recently suggested that they
can. We consider different types of delusions and different ways in which they can
be considered as adaptive: psychologically (e.g., by increasing wellbeing, purpose
in life, intrapsychic coherence, or good functioning) and biologically (e.g., by
enhancing genetic fitness). Although further research is needed to map the costs
and benefits of adopting and maintaining delusional beliefs, a more nuanced pic-
ture of the role of delusions in people's lives has started to emerge.
This article is categorized under:
Philosophy > Representation
Philosophy > Knowledge and Belief
Neuroscience > Cognition
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1 | INTRODUCTION
In this paper we offer a brief overview of clinical delusions as they are discussed in the psychiatric, psychological, and philo-
sophical literature, asking whether they can at the same time be symptoms of psychiatric disorders and have adaptive features.
Delusions emerge in a variety of disorders, including schizophrenia, amnesia, dementia, delusional disorders, depression, and
obsessive–compulsive disorders. They are typically unusual beliefs reported with conviction and held in the face of
counterevidence. They can have varied content: people with delusions of persecution say that others want to harm them; peo-
ple with delusions of mirrored-self misidentification treat the reflection of their own face in the mirror as the face of a stranger,
even though they preserve the general capacity to recognize images in the mirror as reflections.
Can delusions be adaptive? We take a trait or a mechanism to be adaptive if it contributes to the genetic fitness of the
organism, cashed out in terms of increased chances for survival and reproduction. Physical and mental illness have been
accounted for in terms of dysfunction (Wakefield, 1992) and adaptiveness (Murphy, 2005). One view is that illness arises
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either from the breakdown of a mechanism which no longer performs its function or from a change in the environment—some
behavior that increased genetic fitness in the old environment no longer matches the needs of the organism in the new environ-
ment. Delusions are usually categorized as beliefs resulting from the breakdown of some adaptive mechanism (e.g., a deficit
in the belief formation process) or as manifestations of behavior that contributed to genetic fitness in a different environment
but no longer contributes to genetic fitness in the current environment (e.g., paranoia may have been adaptive in an environ-
ment where trusting others was especially risky). The notion of adaptiveness has been developed within evolutionary biology
and in relation to genetic fitness, but by extension it has been used to characterize aspects of behavior that have significant
benefits and whose value is not limited to an increase in an organism's chances of survival and reproduction. For instance, we
can describe delusions as psychologically adaptive if they lead to increased wellbeing (McKay & Dennett, 2009) or have other
psychological benefits such as promoting good functioning, enhancing meaningfulness, or restoring intrapsychic coherence.
First, we describe what delusions are (Section 2). Then, we consider how the notion of adaptiveness has been applied to
them, and what the relationship may be between psychological and biological adaptiveness (Section 3). Further, we review
arguments to the effect that some delusions have psychologically adaptive features (Section 4), and arguments to the effect
that some delusions have biologically adaptive features (Section 5). Next, we introduce the case of delusions in obsessive–
compulsive disorder (OCD) and in major depressive disorders (MDD), where recent evidence suggests that delusional beliefs
can be biologically and psychologically maladaptive in the long term but psychologically adaptive in the short term
(Section 6). In the end, we identify some areas for future research where new evidence may enable us to reach a more satisfac-
tory conclusion about the adaptiveness of some delusions, while remaining skeptical about the possibility to establish whether
delusions in general are adaptive (Section 7).
This skepticism is justified by the fact that “delusion” is used as a family-resemblance term and that different conclusions
about the adaptiveness of a delusion may be drawn depending not only on structural features that are shared by most delusions,
but also on the content of the delusional beliefs, which is subject to great variation. The possibility that delusions are adaptive
deserves further considerations notwithstanding the challenges we highlight, because it has significant implications for our con-
ception of delusions as a symptom of psychiatric disorders and for our interactions with people reporting delusional beliefs.
2 | WHAT ARE DELUSIONS?
There are some controversies about the best way to define delusions and there are also some debates about whether delusion
overlaps with phenomena like self-deception and confabulation. In this section we briefly address these issues.
Here are some definitions of delusions:
A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly held despite what almost everyone
else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The
belief is not ordinarily accepted by other members of the person's culture or subculture (i.e. it is not an article of
religious faith). When a false belief involves a value judgment, it is regarded as a delusion only when the judg-
ment is so extreme as to defy credibility. (APA, 2013, DSM-5, p. 819)
A person is deluded when they have come to hold a particular belief with a degree of firmness that is both utterly
unwarranted by the evidence at hand, and that jeopardises their day-to-day functioning. (McKay, Langdon, &
Coltheart, 2005, p. 315)
Delusions are generally accepted to be beliefs which (a) are held with great conviction; (b) defy rational counter-
argument; and (c) would be dismissed as false or bizarre by members of the same socio-cultural group.
(Gilleen & David, 2005, pp. 5–6)
The definitions above characterize delusions on the basis of their surface features, and in particular their negative epistemic
features, where “epistemic” denotes something that has to do with knowledge and belief. Delusions are defined as beliefs that
are unwarranted, fixed, resistant to counterargument, and implausible. Some definitions also include negative psychological
features, adding that delusions typically compromise wellbeing or good functioning. Most definitions make no reference to
the mechanisms responsible for the formation of delusional beliefs. This is not surprising as delusions emerge in a variety of
contexts and thus researchers have not come to a consensus on the best etiological account of delusions.
Delusions used to be divided into functional and organic: a delusion was called organic if its presence was explained by
brain damage (such as injuries affecting the right cerebral hemisphere), and functional if its presence was explained by psy-
chodynamic or motivational factors. Today, it is acknowledged that there are biological and psychological factors contributing
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to most types of delusions, although there may be still some work to do in order to identify such factors with precision and
map the interaction between them.
Consider the two delusions we introduced earlier, persecution and mirrored-self misidentification. Persecution is usually a
polythematic and elaborated delusion, that is, it extends to more than one theme where the themes can be interrelated, and it is
well integrated in the person's belief system, often driving action that is consistent with the person believing the content of the
delusion. For instance, a young woman who believes that she is surrounded by alien forces that control her own actions and
are slowly taking over people's bodies might decide to run away to protect her loved ones from danger (Payne, 2013).
Mirrored-self misidentification is usually monothematic and circumscribed. That means that, apart from the content of the
delusion itself, the person may not make any other implausible claim and the delusion may not be supported by, or support,
the person's other beliefs. Suppose an elderly man experiencing mirrored-self misidentification is asked whether “the stranger
in the mirror” resembles him. The man might acknowledge that the stranger looks like him, which makes his delusional belief
that the person in the mirror is a stranger even less plausible (Breen, Caine, Coltheart, Hendy, & Roberts, 2000).
Other examples of monothematic delusions are Capgras and Cotard. In Capgras the person claims that a dear one (a close
relative or the spouse) has been replaced by an impostor. In Cotard the person reports being disembodied or dead. In most
cases such beliefs are not interacting with the person's other beliefs, although they may be defended with reasons when chal-
lenged. So, the person with Capgras may not go looking for the loved one who is believed to be missing (although some peo-
ple with Capgras are hostile and even violent towards the alleged impostor) and the person with Cotard may not act dead
(although some people with Cotard may stop routine behavior such as bathing).
One might wonder what the difference is between delusion and other false or irrational behaviors we find in the clinical
and nonclinical population. Most definitions of delusions fail to provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the
phenomenon and leave it open that delusions may overlap with, for instance, cases of self-deception and confabulation.
Self-deception is much more common than delusion and does not seem to have the same disruptive consequences on func-
tioning. In some instances, the phenomena cannot be easily distinguished, as they both involve some belief that is not
well-grounded and that people nonetheless report with conviction and are often prepared to act upon. The distinction between
delusion and self-deception is often characterized by the role of motivational factors. In self-deception, motivational factors
are central. If we are self-deceived, we end up believing what we want to be the case (“My partner is faithful to me,” “I failed
the exam because I was too tired after a night out,” etc.). In delusion, motivational factors may have a role, but need not. The
content of delusional beliefs is not always something we find desirable. In some delusions, we might conjure a positive image
of ourselves, for instance, as people who were chosen by God to accomplish an important mission in delusions of reference;
as the only people able to understand a complex conspiracy in delusions of grandeur; or as attractive sexual partners pursued
by famous people in erotomania.
In other delusions, though, we see ourselves as overwhelmed by guilt (delusions of guilt), or manipulated by external
forces who can control our actions or even insert thoughts in our heads (delusions of passivity and thought insertion). That
said, even thoroughly unpleasant delusions, such as delusions of persecution, might have a defensive role to play, protecting
our self-esteem. Bad events in our lives are explained by the evil intentions of the persecutors and not by our own failings.
Typically, “delusion” refers to a clinical phenomenon and “self-deception” to a nonclinical one, however, there is no sharp
distinction between delusion and self-deception. In this article we shall consider some delusions that are described as “moti-
vated” in that they represent the person's reality as more pleasant than it is. In those cases, the line between delusion and self-
deception cannot be clearly drawn as motivational factors are likely to play a role in both phenomena.
Another distinction that is not made consistently in the literature is between delusion and confabulation. Confabulation, just
like delusion, is primarily characterized by negative epistemic features—it is described as an ill-grounded belief or a false nar-
rative (e.g., Hirstein, 2005). It is key to confabulation that the belief or narrative is genuinely endorsed and presented with no
intention to deceive. So, there is a substantial overlap with delusion. The main difference between delusion and confabulation
is that, as a clinical phenomenon (narrow confabulation), confabulation concerns the distortion or fabrication of a memory,
and thus it most often emerges in psychiatric disorders that feature serious memory impairments such as amnesia and demen-
tia. Delusion does not need to involve memory distortions or fabrications.
As a nonclinical phenomenon (broad confabulation), confabulation is just an explanation that is ill-grounded
(e.g., Hirstein, 2005; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), and thus it does not need to involve any memory impairment. That said, some
differences can be found also between delusion and broad confabulation. Whereas a delusion is usually an implausible belief
that can be further elaborated but does not need to, a confabulation can be very plausible and often takes the shape of an expla-
nation or a narrative, thus exhibiting a high level of elaboration and integration with the person's other beliefs.
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An influential answer to the question about the differences between delusion and self-deception, or delusion and broad con-
fabulation, is that the former is a pathological phenomenon that characterizes a clinical population, whereas the latter is a
widespread phenomenon in the nonclinical population that does not need to impair functioning and does not count as a symp-
tom of mental distress. However, we should be cautious and avoid relying too heavily on the distinction between pathological
and nonpathological belief or between clinical and nonclinical populations, because it is not clear what makes a belief patho-
logical and beliefs with the same epistemic features as delusions are to be found in people who do not experience mental dis-
tress and do not attract a psychiatric diagnosis (Bortolotti, Gunn, & Sullivan-Bissett, 2017).
3 | ADAPTIVENESS
The adaptiveness of delusions has been briefly explored in the recent literature, and we shall review some of the identified
costs and benefits of adopting or maintaining delusional beliefs in Sections 4, 5, and 6. Here we explain why we distinguish
such costs and benefits in biological and psychological, and consider some hypotheses about what the relationship between
the two categories may be.
“Adaptiveness” is first and foremost a biological notion. The goal of adaptive traits is to support the reproductive success
and survival of the biological organism they belong to. Crucially, adaptiveness is not a timeless process but rather a historical
one, and an adaptive trait is closely connected to the environment in which it develops. Thus, some traits can be adaptive in
one environment without being adaptive in other environments, or they can lose their adaptiveness as a consequence of envi-
ronmental changes. By analogy with biological adaptiveness, some authors speak of psychological adaptiveness when a belief,
state of mind. or mechanism delivers important psychological benefits to an organism, such as enhancing its psychological
wellbeing.
It is not clear how biological and psychological adaptiveness relate to each other. As Ryan McKay and Daniel Dennett elo-
quently write, behaviors that are psychologically adaptive may not be biologically so, and behaviors that are biologically adap-
tive may not be psychologically so:
Here we must be careful to honour a distinction, often complacently ignored, between human happiness and
genetic fitness. If the most promising path, on average, to having more surviving grand offspring is one that
involves pain and hardship, natural selection will not be deterred in the least from pursuing it (it is well to remind
ourselves of the insect species in which the males are beheaded in the normal course of copulation, or – some-
what closer to home – the ruthless siblingcide practiced by many bird species). (McKay & Dennett,
2009, p. 502)
As Randolph Nesse (1998, p. 401) also says: “natural selection shaped the regulation mechanisms for maximal reproductive
success, not for peace and happiness.” In some cases, nature seems to have designed us to derive pleasure from those behav-
iors which foster reproductive success and survival, such as sexual intercourse (e.g., Fleischman, 2016). However, in other
cases, biological and psychological adaptiveness come apart. For instance, enjoying very low levels of anxiety can be psycho-
logically beneficial, but poses a threat to reproductive fitness. This is because, if we underestimate danger, then we drastically
decrease our chances of survival and reproduction (e.g., Lee, Wadsworth, & Hotopf, 2006). In the case of beliefs more specifi-
cally, as McKay and Dennett (2009) argued, a belief leading to psychological wellbeing may or may not be biologically adap-
tive. We will review cases of delusions which seems to be both psychologically and biologically beneficial in the short term,
such as motivated delusions, and cases of delusions where psychological benefits come with an increase of the severity of
symptoms, such as delusions in MDD and OCD.
3.1 | The doxastic shear-pin
What would it mean for delusions to be adaptive? As delusions are commonly defined on the basis of their negative features
and are symptoms of a number of severe disorders, the possibility that they are adaptive in any sense is often quickly dis-
missed. However, it has been suggested that delusions are an instance of misbelief that is potentially adaptive. McKay and
Dennett introduce the metaphor of the doxastic shear pin to ask whether delusions are the outcome of a mechanism that is
designed to malfunction in some circumstances in order to prevent a more serious malfunctioning from occurring.
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A shear pin is a metal pin installed in, say, the drive train of a marine engine. The shear pin locks the propeller to
the propeller shaft and is intended to “shear” should the propeller hit a log or other hard object. (McKay &
Dennett, 2009, p. 497)
Shear pins are designed to break under extreme conditions, allowing a system to keep functioning, although in an imperfect
manner. Delusions might act as shear pins, allowing the doxastic system to keep working in times of extreme distress. In this
picture, delusions emerge as a response to a breakdown threatening a person's epistemic and emotional engagement with
reality.
We envision doxastic shear pins as components of belief evaluation machinery that are “designed” to break in sit-
uations of extreme psychological stress (analogous to the mechanical overload that breaks a shear pin or the
power surge that blows a fuse). Perhaps the normal function (both normatively and statistically construed) of
such components would be to constrain the influence of motivational processes on belief formation. Breakage of
such components, therefore, might permit the formation and maintenance of comforting misbeliefs – beliefs that
would ordinarily be rejected as ungrounded, but that would facilitate the negotiation of overwhelming circum-
stances […] and that would thus be adaptive in such extraordinary circumstances. (McKay & Dennett,
2009, p. 501)
McKay and Dennett consider the possibility that some delusions may be biologically adaptive as doxastic shear pins, and in
the end they reject this hypothesis. However, this has not stopped other scholars using the doxastic shear pin metaphor to
argue for the potential adaptiveness of delusions. For instance, Lisa Bortolotti argued that motivated delusions, as well as delu-
sions in schizophrenia, can have both psychological and, indirectly, epistemic benefits (Bortolotti, 2015, 2016). By enabling
the doxastic system to continue working (albeit imperfectly) when the person is at risk of being overwhelmed by negative
emotions or by the uncertainty caused by anomalous experience, delusions support the person's capacity to pursue and achieve
some of her epistemic goals. Without the psychological relief that the delusion offers, the person's capacity to pursue and
achieve her epistemic goals would be compromised by a disrupted or absent interaction with her surrounding environment.
Philip Corlett and colleagues argue against McKay and Dennett that the doxastic shear-pin hypothesis leads to the claim
that all delusions are biologically—not just psychologically—adaptive (see Fineberg & Corlett, 2016; Mishara & Corlett,
2009). This is because on their account delusions arise as a response to aberrant prediction error signals and permit “ongoing
function in the face of paralyzing difficulty” (Fineberg & Corlett, 2016, p. 73). Fineberg and Corlett argue that the function of
delusions is to keep a person in contact with her environment in situations of emergency and view this as a contribution to sur-
vival: “our model indicates how delusions may be adaptive as a shear pin function by enabling the patient to remain in vital
connection with his/her environment” and “patients continue to respond reflexively to the environmental cues incumbent upon
them, necessary for continued survival” (Mishara & Corlett, 2009, p. 531). On this account, the emergency is described differ-
ently from how it is described by McKay and Dennett. For McKay and Dennett, the risk is that negative emotions may over-
whelm the person and cause a complete absence of interaction with the environment via severe depression, which may occur
when the shear pin does not break. For Mishara and Corlett, instead, the risk is that the learning system crashes due to the per-
sistent prediction-error signals it receives and is disabled, leaving the person unable to gather information about aspects of her
environment that are crucial to her survival. So, the averted danger is presented not just as a psychological benefit, but as a
biological one.
We will come back to this account in the next section, where we consider the hypothesis that delusional beliefs are biologi-
cally adaptive.
4 | BIOLOGICAL ADAPTIVENESS OF DELUSIONS
In this section, we review the reasons for considering delusions maladaptive and then turn to one influential argument for the
biological adaptiveness of delusions, suggesting that they are instrumental to learning being restored after the effect of dis-
rupting prediction error signals. There is evidence suggesting that delusions are biologically maladaptive. The presence of
delusions is a predictor of poor long-term outcome in people with paranoid psychosis (Jørgensen, Aagaard, Jespersen, & Mor-
tensen, 1987) and people with schizophrenia who often experience hallucinations and delusions marry and reproduce less than
controls (Nanko & Moridaira, 1993), suggesting that psychiatric disorders characterized by psychotic symptoms compromise
a person's chances to mate and reproduce. Although there is still disagreement about how delusions are formed and
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maintained, the plausible candidate theories present delusions as the outcome of a malfunctioning mechanism, though the
nature of the mechanism involved varies from one account to the next. One-factor theories (Maher, 1974) and predictive
processing models (Corlett, Taylor, Wang, Fletcher, & Krystal, 2010; Fletcher & Frith, 2008) argue that abnormal perceptions
or aberrant predictive error signals are necessary and sufficient for delusional beliefs. Instead, two-factor accounts (Coltheart,
Menzies, & Sutton, 2010; Davies, Coltheart, Langdon, & Breen, 2001; Stone & Young, 1997) hold that abnormal data are
necessary but not sufficient to account for the adoption of delusions, introducing a second factor. This is to be identified with
some form of reasoning bias or deficit. Error management theorists argue that delusions are the outcome of extreme, patholog-
ical versions of evolutionary biases (Miyazono, 2015; McKay & Dennett, 2009, p. 502). What theory of delusion formation
we adopt matters to whether we believe that delusions can be adaptive. Delusions are biologically adaptive if, as a response to
a crisis of some sort (anomalous perception or overwhelming distress), they enhance a person's chances of reproductive suc-
cess and survival by conferring systematic biological benefits. The view that delusions have biological benefits has been def-
ended by some predictive coding theorists and we now turn to their account.
4.1 | Making sense of anomalous experience
Predictive coding assumes that the brain is a predictive machine governed by a simple principle: to minimize uncertainty and
to build an internal model of the world which reduces to a minimum the discrepancy between what is expected and what is
experienced (Hohwy, 2014). It proves difficult to reduce predictive coding to either a one-factor or a two-factor account
(Miyazono, Bortolotti & Broome, 2015). Contrarily to both one and two-factor theories, prediction error theories do not draw
a sharp distinction between perception and belief (Fletcher & Frith, 2008; Williams, 2018). This is because in predictive cod-
ing perception and belief are two temporal phases of the same process of hierarchical Bayesian inference. While perceptions
take place lower down in the hierarchy, at a faster and more limited spatiotemporal scale, beliefs (delusions included) are gen-
erated at a higher level of the same hierarchy, at a larger and more abstract spatiotemporal level. Another important distinction
between prediction-error theories and either the one-factor or the two-factor account is that, instead of perceptions unidirec-
tionally influencing beliefs, in predictive processing perceptions and beliefs dynamically sculpt one another, so that we do not
just believe what we see but we also see what we believe (McKay, 2012).
According to prediction error theories, delusions are reached via a single impairment in the hierarchy of inference
(Bortolotti & Miyazono, 2015). The impairment in question would be represented by aberrant prediction-error signals, which
cause the subject to depart from ideal Bayesian norms of rationality. Normally, prediction errors signal a discrepancy between
what the person expects and what she actually experiences, so that the experience either is discarded because it conflicts with
the person's existing beliefs, or it is taken to imply that something was amiss in the person's expectations and new beliefs need
to be adopted. The criteria according to which an experience either is discarded or causes prior beliefs to be updated depend
on the estimation of the precision of the prediction error. If a prediction error is estimated to be precise, it results into an
updating of the existing beliefs; if it is not estimated to be precise, the experience is discarded.
In people with delusions, prediction errors are elicited when they should not, by events that appear significant and salient
but are unsurprising, or they are mistakenly weighted as highly precise.
[P]rediction error theories of delusional formation suggest that under the influence of inappropriate prediction
error signal, possibly as a consequence of dopamine dysregulation, events that are insignificant and merely coin-
cident seem to demand attention, feel important and relate to each other in meaningful ways. Delusions ultimately
arise as a means of explaining these odd experiences.” (Corlett et al., 2010, p. 1)
Due to the high precision erroneously assigned to the prediction error, its rejection is not a viable option. Hence a revision of
priors takes place, and a delusional belief is adopted as a new prior making sense of the anomalous experience. At a later
stage, further aberrant perceptions are explained in the light of the delusional prior, giving way to a process of reinforcement
which strengthens the endorsement of the delusion (Fineberg & Corlett, 2016, p. 79).
4.2 | Resuming automated learning
Within a predictive coding framework, advocates of delusional adaptiveness argue that the main biological benefit of delu-
sions consists in enabling the learning system to resume its normal function in the face of aberrant perceptions and prediction-
error signals (Fineberg & Corlett, 2016, pp. 73–76; Mishara & Corlett, 2009, p. 530). By explaining anomalous perceptions
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and prediction errors, delusions not only provide some short-term relief from uncertainty, but they also salvage the learning
capabilities of the person by protecting her from the danger of having frequent, unexplained and highly precise aberrant pre-
diction error signals. These are thought to disrupt the normal process of learning and, as far as they persist, to severely impair
the contact of the person with the world. The view is that, by explaining aberrant prediction errors, delusions prevent a com-
plete loss of contact with reality. This is regarded to be biologically adaptive, because being in contact with reality in an
impaired manner affords a person better chances of survival than being in no contact with reality at all.
Although on this view delusions “rescue” the learning system, when adopted and maintained, they disable its most flexible
and cognitively expensive part. There are in fact two distinct parts of the learning system which compete to control behavior,
one goal-directed, the other habitual. While the former “involves learning flexible relationships between actions and out-
comes” (Mishara & Corlett, 2009, p. 530), the latter mirrors a more stereotyped relationship between stimuli and responses,
such that a particular stimulus always triggers a particular response, independently from the outcome. When delusions are
adopted, the flexibility of the former system is disabled to permit ongoing learning, while the latter system takes over in con-
trolling the person's delusional beliefs (Fineberg & Corlett, 2016, p. 76). On the account, this explains the fixity and inflexibil-
ity of delusional states, features that make them more similar to habits than to actions that are sensitive to rewards. Although
the goal-directed system still functions in the formation and assessment of other beliefs, it is disabled with regard to the delu-
sional beliefs: it would be cognitively too costly to keep it working in the face of anomalous perceptions and predictive errors.
Here is an example. The belief that her spouse has been replaced by an identically looking imposter provides an explana-
tion for the anomalous feeling of unfamiliarity the person looks at experiences when she sees her spouse's face (delusional for-
mation). The delusional belief (“My spouse has been replaced by an impostor”) is then reinforced by the persistency of the
aberrant feelings of unfamiliarity and ends up being adopted as a new prior which explains the perceptions in question (delu-
sional maintenance). There are several advantages to entertaining such a bizarre belief: the discrepancy between perceptions
and expectations is reduced, the anxiety induced by the unexplained experiences is relieved, and learning is resumed as soon
as the prediction errors are got rid of. Now the person can focus her attention on other things rather than spending all her
resources trying to make sense of a persistent feeling of unfamiliarity when looking at her spouse. Life can go on, but at a
price.
The sensitivity of the new belief to counter-evidence has been disabled. From a cognitive point of view, it would in fact be
too expensive to maintain belief flexibility in the presence of the mental distress brought about by the aberrant prediction-error
signals which accompany the delusional perception (Fineberg & Corlett, 2016, p. 76; Gold et al., 2013). Hence, delusions
restore the contact of the person with reality—in the sense that they allow the person to focus her attention and mental energy
on something different from her aberrant perceptions—but at the cost of the responsiveness of her newly formed beliefs to
evidence.
4.3 | Problems with the adaptiveness claim
How plausible is it that delusions contribute to keep a person in contact with reality? The idea is that delusions provide an
explanation to previously unexplained aberrant perceptions that would otherwise monopolize the person's cognitive resources.
By doing so, delusions would allow the person to focus on aspects of the world other than those that are the object of her aber-
rant perceptions. In this picture, the adoption of a delusion restores the process of learning which is momentarily blocked by
the presence of salient, unexplained perceptions.
This account is controversial. Many delusions are thought to absorb and hijack cognitive resources instead of freeing them
up. As we saw earlier, people with delusions of persecution may be preoccupied that ill-intentioned aliens wish them harm
and that thought might dominate their mental life. They often take action like moving cities and avoiding contact with people
to keep themselves and others safe. It is apparent that in such cases delusions are time and energy consuming rather than cog-
nitively liberating. However, a supporter of the adaptiveness of delusions might not need to deny that maintaining the delu-
sions in the long run can cause severe disruption to a person's life. Rather, the claim is that, when the delusion is adopted, the
person may be better off by believing that alien forces are persecuting her than being bombarded by inexplicable and dis-
comforting perceptions. The veracity of such a claim is an empirical issue, as it implies ascertaining whether people with
abnormal perceptions and no delusions are worse off than people having both abnormal perceptions and delusions. One
consideration is that the phase of abnormal perceptions usually preceding the formation of delusions (e.g., the so-called
“prodromal phase” in schizophrenic delusions) might last days, months, even years (Mishara & Corlett, 2009). If someone
experiences aberrant perceptions for years, it is implausible to imagine that she is in a state of emergency for such a long time.
LANCELLOTTA AND BORTOLOTTI 7 of 15
Again, a supporter of the adaptiveness of delusions might reply that the shear pin breaks only when aberrant perceptions have
reached a certain threshold of intensity, and this might well take years to happen.
5 | PSYCHOLOGICAL ADAPTIVENESS OF DELUSIONS
In this section we consider the rather obvious psychological costs of adopting delusional beliefs and the less obvious (often
short-term) benefits that adopting delusions can bestow on agents who are already experiencing what can be described as a cri-
sis (McKay & Dennett, 2009). Many delusions have detrimental psychological effects, causing unhappiness and worry to the
people who experience them (see, e.g., Garety & Hemsley, 1987). All delusions can be disruptive in the sense that they alter
the person's sense of reality and compromise socialization by causing the person with the delusions to become overly preoccu-
pied with the content of the delusion and isolated. Moreover, some psychological harm can stem directly from the content of
the delusion. We saw earlier that in some cases of persecutory delusions, the person lives in fear, worried that the threats she
experiences are going to cause her or her loved ones pain or death.
Some other delusions, however, are not held with distress. On the contrary, depending on their content, some delusions
can confer a sense of purpose and boost self-esteem (see, e.g., McCreery & Claridge, 2002; Peters, Day, Mckenna, & Orbach,
1999; Roberts, 1991). For instance, delusions of reference and delusions of grandeur can make the person feel important and
worthy of admiration. Whether the delusions with desirable content have positive or negative psychological effects depends
on the preferred notion of wellbeing, as has been argued before (for instance, see Miyazono, 2015). Delusions of reference
and grandeur have psychological benefits on a hedonic view of wellbeing, intended as a subjective feeling about how well
one's life is going. On a eudaimonic view of wellbeing, however, where the authenticity and meaningfulness of a person's life,
her agency, and her capacity to function socially are also taken into account, even delusions with positive content can have
negative effects. Believing that one is Napoleon is empowering, but the clash between the belief and the reality of the person's
surroundings means that there is a loss of contact with the physical and social environment, and alienation ensues.
That said, there are accounts where delusions are described as responses to a critical situation, maybe the beginning of a
solution, rather than the source of the problem. It is not clear to what extent this view can be generalized to all types of delu-
sions, but some adaptive features can be identified in different types of delusions. Some delusions in schizophrenia provide
temporary anxiety relief by offering explanations for unusual experiences. Some elaborated delusions can increase a sense of
meaningfulness and purpose. Some “motivated” delusions make a harsh reality temporarily less distressing. And some delu-
sions in dementia fill gaps in a person's failing understanding of the world.
5.1 | Putting an end to uncertainty
In some influential accounts of the formation of delusions in the context of schizophrenia (such as the ones provided by
Kapur, 2003), the adoption of a delusional belief is said to offer the person some relief from anxiety:
First, endogenous psychosis evolves slowly (not overnight). For many patients it evolves through a series of
stages: a stage of heightened awareness and emotionality combined with a sense of anxiety and impasse, a drive
to ‘make sense’ of the situation, and then usually relief and a ‘new awareness’ as the delusion crystallizes and
hallucinations emerge. (Kapur, 2003, p. 15)
The idea is that in the first stage of psychosis the person has experiences that appear to her as inexplicably salient and this cau-
ses anxiety and negative emotions that can become overwhelming, with adverse effects for well-being. The sense is that some-
thing important is about to happen, but there is no indication of what that something might be. As in the classic literature on
delusions by Jaspers (1963) and Conrad Mishara (2010), the delusion emerges as an explanation or a revelation, taking away
the sense of uncertainty. Although the adoption of the delusion can be seen as a temporary relief from anxiety, the delusion
itself can become a source of anxiety in the long run. Especially when delusions have distressing content, they can affect nega-
tively a person's life. That is why anxiety relief is likely to be temporary, an effect of the adoption but not of the prolonged
maintenance of the delusion.
People may no longer feel anxious about their hypersalient experience (for example, ‘how should I interpret
this?’), but they can feel anxious and distressed about how the world is according to the delusion (for example,
‘how can I escape from the alien forces persecuting me?’). (Bortolotti, 2016, pp. 890–891)
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5.2 | Finding life meaningful
In an interesting study aimed at exploring the potential adaptiveness of delusions (Roberts, 1991), people with elaborated and
systematized delusions were found to score higher than people in remission, rehabilitation nurses, and Anglican ordinands in
the “purpose in life” test and the “life regard” index, which measure respectively a person's experience of meaning and pur-
pose in life and a person's regard for her own life. The conclusion of the study is that “for some there may be satisfaction in
psychosis and that [delusion formation] is adaptive” (Roberts, 1991, p. 19). The psychological adaptiveness of the delusion is
ascribed to two factors: the delusion serves as an explanation for an experience that was distressing or perplexing for the per-
son, bringing relief from uncertainty; and the delusional reality may be preferable to the actual reality the person finds herself
in, playing a defensive function.
More recently, it has been found that people in acute delusional state may have a greater “sense of coherence” than people
with no psychiatric diagnosis (Bergstein, Weizman, & Solomon, 2008). The sense of coherence encompasses the feeling that
there are projects that are both worth engaging and challenging, and that the person has the resources to pursue them. The
sense of coherence is positively correlated with wellbeing.
5.3 | Overcoming trauma
In Section 3, we saw that one of the main reasons put forward in the literature for the psychological adaptiveness of
delusions—McKay and Dennett's original doxastic shear pin account—is that some delusions (especially so-called motivated
delusions) play a defensive function, representing the world as the person would like it to be.
One example is anosognosia, which most commonly involves the denial that a limb is paralyzed (“I am moving my arm,”
when the arm cannot move; or “I can climb stairs but I am a little slow,” when legs are paralyzed). People with anosognosia
often deny obvious evidence of their impairment (Berti, Spinazzola, Pia, & Rabuffetti, 1993, p. 164). The delusion has nega-
tive effects, compromising the shared reality between the person and her closest ones. Further problems are likely to emerge if
the person refuses to acknowledge the implications of her impairment and fails to engage in rehabilitation.
However, when people need to live with the consequences of trauma, denying the impairment can be adaptive in the short
term (Fotopoulou, 2008; Ramachandran, 1996) as people do not have to accept that they are severely disabled and that their
lives have dramatically changed. Overwhelming negative emotions would compromise the person's capacity to interact with
her physical and social environment because severe depression would not be conducive to the pursuit of her goals. Indeed,
people who experience anosognosia are found to have fewer negative emotions and reduced anxiety with respect to people
who acknowledge their impairment.
5.4 | Filling gaps
Delusional beliefs may emerge in people with middle- to late-stage dementia, usually beliefs involving suspicions or paranoia
(e.g., the belief that someone is stealing things). Although the memory impairment can be a trigger for the suspicion or the
accusation (e.g., the person cannot remember where she placed her possessions), such delusional beliefs are not distorted
memory reports but firmly held beliefs that the person does not typically abandon as a result of a reasoned argument.
Such delusional beliefs are extremely distressing for caregivers who are often the object of suspicions and accusations, and
who need to manage the person's delusions-driven behavior. However, in the circumstances in which the person finds herself,
it is not difficult to see how the delusional beliefs play the role of (implausible but) handy explanations for unexpected events
(“I cannot find my wallet”), thereby offering some short-term relief to them as they are trying to make sense of a physical and
social world that is increasingly hard to navigate.
6 | DELUSIONS IN OCD AND MDD
Here we turn to delusional beliefs emerging in disorders that traditionally do not involve psychotic symptoms, such as OCD
and MDD. Although the question whether delusions are adaptive in these contexts may be premature, the literature suggests
that there may be some short-term psychological benefits for the people with OCD or MDD who develop delusional beliefs
congruent with their habits or moods.
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6.1 | Delusions in OCD
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
OCD is characterized by the presence of obsessions and/or compulsions. Obsessions are recurrent and persistent
thoughts, urges, or images that are experienced as intrusive and unwanted, whereas compulsions are repetitive
behaviours or mental acts that an individual feels driven to perform in response to an obsession or according to
rules that must be applied rigidly. (APA, 2013, DSM-5, p. 235)
Most people with OCD display good insight into their illness, regarding their obsessive–compulsive behaviors as unwarranted
and exaggerated. However, in a minority of cases (around 4% according to DSM-5, p. 238) people hold their obsessive–
compulsive thoughts with delusional conviction, fearing that not ritualising will bring about dreaded consequences.
[X] thought a supernatural ‘power’ inserted unpleasant thoughts into her mind, e.g. “if you read that book a rela-
tive will die” […] To appease the ‘power’ and the thoughts, she developed complex counting rituals pervading
her daily activities. She also did ritualistic hand-washing and checking. She avoided specific numbers, colours
and clothes and counted from 0 to 8 on her fingers and toes throughout the day […] She felt unable to resist the
rituals, as her belief in negative consequences was absolute. (O'Dwyer & Marks, 2000, p. 282)
The reasons why obsessions might develop into delusion-like beliefs are far from being fully understood; however, some pro-
posals have been advanced. It has been hypothesized that high levels of anxiety, combined with obsessions, predict the forma-
tion of delusional beliefs (Bortolon & Raffard, 2015). Single-themed obsessions, magical thinking, and depressive symptoms
are all factors that contribute to delusional ideation in OCD on some accounts (Fear, Sharp, & Healy, 2000). Further studies
are required to explore if delusional experiences in OCD might play an adaptive role. Is delusional ideation in OCD an adap-
tive response or just a worsening of the distress which characterizes obsessive–compulsive thoughts and behaviors?
While the latter hypothesis has garnered most of the attention from research—with studies showing that delusional forms
of OCD are associated with “a graver clinical picture” than nondelusional forms (Poyurovsky, 2013, p. 173)—so far the for-
mer has not received much consideration. However, an adaptive role, whether biological or psychological, for delusional
forms of obsessions should not be prematurely ruled out. Delusional beliefs in OCD might in fact help the person preserve a
sense of rational agency. An agent is deemed to be rational when her actions are consistent with her desires and beliefs. For
example, the act of Jamie's drinking a glass of water is rational if it results from his desire to extinguish his thirst and the belief
that drinking a glass of water will effectively do so.
In OCD desires are expressed by obsessions. For example, Bonnie might strongly want her house not to burn down
(obsession/desire) and, in order to prevent that, she might think that she has to check the stove 30 times per day (belief ). As a
consequence of her desires and beliefs, Bonnie will feel driven to perform the action of checking the stove 30 times per day
(action/compulsion). Even if people with OCD do not assume that the link among their obsessions, beliefs, and actions is a
rational one, they still feel the drive to perform the relevant actions. In other words, Bonnie might not be convinced that check-
ing the stove 30 times per day is necessary to prevent her house from burning down, yet she performs that action anyway. This
generates problems for Bonnie's sense of rational agency: people with OCD cannot often make sense of their own actions, feel
out of control, and are conflicted due to the discrepancy between their beliefs and actions. If an obsession reaches delusional
intensity, however, the discrepancy between what is believed and what is acted upon significantly diminishes. If Bonnie is
(delusionally) convinced that checking the stove 30 times per day will prevent her house from burning down, then her
action—checking the stove—will seem more rationally justified to her than if she lacked that conviction. Arguably, the preser-
vation of one's sense of rational agency confers a sense of control on one's actions and a feeling that one's actions effectively
bring about the satisfaction of one's desires. Hence, it might be the case that, even if biologically maladaptive, delusions in
OCD confer psychological benefits that come from restoring the intrapsychic coherence necessary for preserving one's sense
of rational agency.
6.2 | Delusions in MDD
Delusions in MDD do not appear to be adaptive in a biological sense, as people with depression who also have delusions show
a higher suicide rate than their nondelusional counterparts (Roose, 1983), suggesting that the presence of delusions can impact
negatively on survival. However, a similar argument as for delusions in OCD can apply to delusions in MDD. The presence
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of delusions can reduce the perceived conflict between the agent's mood and the agent's beliefs, which can be psychologically
draining.
So-called psychotic depression or depressive psychosis is a major depressive episode that can be accompanied by delusions
and hallucinations (Gerretsen et al., 2015; Hales & Yudofsky, 2003) as well as very low mood, lack of interest in everyday
matters, problems with sleeping, feelings of guilt, and obsessive self-accusations. Most delusions in severe depression are
mood-congruent, which means that their content matches the person's mood experienced (Hales & Yudofsky, 2003).
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (APA, 2013, DSM-5), common themes of depressive
delusions are persecution, guilt, punishment, personal inadequacy, or disease.
It is controversial whether depression with delusions is a form of unipolar depression or a form of psychosis (e.g., Frances,
Brown, Kocsis, & Mann, 1981; Parker, Roy, Hadzi-Pavlovic, & Pedic, 1992). Those who argue that depression with delusions
is a form of depressive disorder (e.g., Stanghellini & Raballo, 2015) point to a significant difference between delusions in
schizophrenia and delusions in depression: whereas delusions in schizophrenia are a revelation and disclose some new and
surprising content, the content of delusions in depression contains information that is already known and familiar. For
instance, delusions of guilt in MDD may validate a feeling of guilt and confirm the person's conviction that she has done
something wrong.
Following from this observation and drawing on an influential theory of depression (see Beck, 1967), it has been argued
that delusions in depression can be viewed as adaptive from a psychological point of view (see, e.g., Antrobus & Bortolotti,
2016). People with MDD have feelings that are often not confirmed by the evidence available to them; typically, they feel
guilty and inadequate. Delusions that contain negative self-related information help them preserve coherence in their self-
appraisals. This is a significant effect, because we already know that people have a general tendency to restore coherence
between moods and beliefs, or between conflicting beliefs, when coherence is compromised (see for instance, Heider, 1946;
Festinger, 1957). It is possible that mood-congruent delusions in MDD offer validation for the guilt, shame, and hopelessness
the person experiences, and contribute to avoiding fragmentation in one's self-concept, enhancing intrapsychic coherence. At
the same time, they may cause depressive symptoms to become more severe, thus compromising biological adaptiveness
overall.
7 | HOW DO WE ESTABLISH AND MEASURE ADAPTIVENESS?
It is controversial whether delusions can be biologically adaptive, but it is possible to describe delusions as psychologically
adaptive, in some cases and in the short term. The psychological benefits of delusional beliefs vary depending on the type of
beliefs, their content, and the context in which they are adopted. This means that different measures of psychological adaptive-
ness will apply to different delusions. The notions of subjective wellbeing and psychological wellbeing capture key aspects of
the philosophical accounts of wellbeing known respectively as hedonism and eudemonism. Hedonism holds that wellbeing is
a subjective feeling of pleasure and pain. Instead, according to eudemonism, wellbeing also depends on a positive assessment
of one's functioning and on the meaningfulness of one's life. Both parameters are relevant to the psychological adaptiveness of
delusions.
To sum up, we saw that some delusional beliefs are thought to relieve anxiety and stress; the effects of delusions that are
elaborated may include enhancing the sense that one's life is important and meaningful; motivated delusions can be described
as a temporary coping mechanism in response to trauma or adversities; delusional beliefs in dementia can help fill explanatory
gaps that would be otherwise difficult to live with, enabling one to build a coherent self-image encompassing beliefs, emo-
tions, and behaviors; and finally, delusions can sustain the sense of one's rational agency, restoring intrapsychic coherence. In
most of our examples, delusions are thought to make a positive contribution to the hedonic form of wellbeing, which can be
measured relying on self-reports or behavior (e.g., by asking people how their lives are going) or on physiological indicators
(e.g., by tracking the oscillations in the levels of stress-related hormones such as cortisol as in Fineberg & Corlett, 2016).
It is more difficult to ascertain if delusions also make a positive contribution with regard to eudaimonic wellbeing, although
we did see that in some studies elaborated delusions have been shown to increase people's sense of coherence, which suggests
that they feel their lives have a purpose. In other cases, it is not clear what contributions delusions make. Do delusions in
schizophrenia and OCD ameliorate people's functioning? Answering such a question requires weighing one effect against the
other. Relief from anxiety and the restoration of intrapsychic coherence support good functioning, but delusions are very often
all-absorbing, a feature which seems to speak in favor of the common belief that delusions interfere with good functioning.
One way to establish if and to what extent delusions are conducive to good functioning in the critical circumstances in
which they emerge would be to compare indicators of good functioning in people who experience mental health issues and
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have delusions with people who experience similar mental health issues but have no delusions. Given that both groups, with
and without delusions, are vulnerable to the similar psychological difficulties, evidence for the psychological adaptiveness of
delusions would lie in whether people with delusions function better than their people without. What we know about delusions
at this stage suggests that the prospects for delusions to enhance good functioning are not promising.
8 | CONCLUSION
In this paper, we reviewed some of the arguments in favor of clinical delusions having psychologically adaptive or biologi-
cally adaptive features. Whereas the costs of delusions are well-known—and many of the definitions of delusions are indeed
based on their negative features—the potential benefits of delusions have not been studied thoroughly yet. We highlighted
both interesting contributions and significant gaps where plausible claims need to be investigated further. It is safe to conclude
at this stage that many delusions are in the long run psychologically harmful and biologically maladaptive, but that their adop-
tion can be understood in context as offering some short-term benefits, as a response to an emergency situation, although dif-
ferent authors characterize the nature of the emergency and the response to it in different terms. For instance, some motivated
delusions can be seen as a coping mechanism to avoid major depression and suicide in case of overwhelming negative emo-
tions caused by trauma; delusions formed in response to anomalous experiences can be seen as a means of relieving anxiety
and restoring habitual processes of learning which were disrupted by aberrant prediction-error signals; and delusions in OCD
and MDD can be seen as reducing the conflict caused by a clash in the person's emotions, beliefs, and behaviors and as restor-
ing some levels of intrapsychic coherence (see Table 1).
There are several questions that the empirical and philosophical literature has as yet failed to answer satisfactorily, and
these are relevant to the adaptiveness of delusions. One is whether it makes sense to talk about delusions (and other beliefs
regarded as symptoms of psychiatric disorders) as pathological in themselves, or whether their role should be evaluated only
as part of a more comprehensive analysis of a person's behavioral patterns. If delusions are pathological, what makes them so?
Is it simply the fact that they are the outcome of a malfunction, or is the fact that they have detrimental effects on people's
agency and survival? Answering such a question sounds daunting, but it is important to consider the implications that claims
about the adaptiveness of delusions have for clinical practice, science, and society at large. A change of perspective in the way
delusions are defined and assessed would also bring new levels of complexity to both symptom management in psychiatry
TABLE 1 Sample reasons for and against the adaptiveness of delusions found in the literature
Wellbeing and good functioning Survival, good health, and reproduction
Delusional beliefs in
schizophrenia
• Their adoption brings short-term anxiety relief by ending
the uncertainty caused by perplexing experience.
• Depending on their content, their maintenance may
cause distress. They are also likely to compromise
socialization due to the lack of a shared reality.
• According to some predictive processing accounts, their
adoption helps resume automated learning after disrupted
prediction-error signals. Habitual processes enable
engagement with the physical and social environment.
• Given that flexible learning relative to the delusional
content is disabled, delusions are fixed beliefs.
Delusional beliefs in dementia • Their adoption and maintenance may lead to the
construction of a better self and a better reality or fill
explanatory gaps created by memory impairments.
• Their maintenance may cause inconsistencies in the
self-narrative and compromise socialization due to the
lack of a shared reality.
• They may contribute to self-esteem and reduce the risk
of depression. They may also support the pursuit of one's
goals by sustaining motivation.
• By distorting reality, they may prevent one from finding
the best means to achieve one's goals.
“Motivated” delusions • Their adoption and maintenance allow one to construct a
better self and a better reality in response to negative
emotions that could otherwise become overwhelming.
• Clashes between delusional content and reality may
cause confusion and disappointment and compromise
social relationships due to lack of a shared reality.
• By making one feel better, they enhance mood and
reduce the risk of depression. They may also support the
pursuit of one's goals by sustaining motivation.
• Due their distorting reality, they may prevent one from
finding the best means to achieve one's goals.
Delusional beliefs in MDD or
OCD
• They restore coherence between low mood and belief
(MDD); and between obsessive and compulsive
behavior and belief (OCD). Thus, they reduce
fragmentation in the self-narrative and tension in the
sense of self.
• They can contribute to symptoms of MDD or OCD
worsening.
• By making one feel worse, more guilty and inadequate,
and less competent, delusions in MDD adversely affect
mood which may negatively impact on goal pursuit via
motivation.
• People with OCD who have delusions show poorer
functioning and higher levels of depression than people
with OCD who do not have delusions.
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and cognitive models in cognitive neuroscience research. Further, and most importantly, viewing delusions as responses to a
crisis and as imperfect solutions to serious problems may be instrumental to challenging the pervasive stigma still associated
with psychotic symptoms. An appreciation of the role that the adoption of a delusional belief may play should inform interac-
tions between people who experience delusions and people who do not, hopefully enhancing understanding and cooperation.
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